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# From Farfalle to MEGAFONO via CIMINION: The PRF Hydra for MPC Applications

Lorenzo Grassi, Morten Øygarden, Markus Schofnegger, Roman Walch

25.04.2023





# **Domain Specific Symmetric Primitives**

- Modern cryptographic protocols
  - MPC: Multiple parties jointly compute a function on private input
  - HE: Compute on encrypted data
  - ZKP: Proof validity of statements without leaking witnesses
- Symmetric Primitives are useful in these protocols
- ... but have different design criteria:
  - Prime fields
  - Minimizing multiplicative complexity/depth
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# Symmetric Primitives for MPC

- Use cases:
  - Encryption/decryption with unknown key
    - Key-Management: Software HSM via MPC
    - Suspending expensive MPC computations
    - Transferring data into/out of delegated MPC computations
  - $\Rightarrow$  Symmetric key is secret shared in MPC
- Cost target: Mainly minimizing number of multiplications
- MiMC, GMiMC, HADESMiMC, *Rescue*, CIMINION, ...

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# CIMINION (Eurocrypt 2021)

- Based on a modified Farfalle [BDH+17]
  - Expensive Permutation *P*
  - Cheaper Permutation  $\mathcal{P}^{(e)}$ 
    - Fast for encrypting large data
- Problem:
  - Round keys K<sub>i</sub> created by expensive hash function instantiated with P
  - Only efficient in MPC if key schedule can be discarded
  - Not the case in many use cases!



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## **Goals and Contribution**

- Goal:
  - MPC-friendly cipher as efficient as CIMINION
  - ...without expensive key schedule
- Contribution:
  - MEGAFONO design strategy
  - Efficient instantiation: The PRF Hydra
    - Extendable output, used as stream cipher

# HYDRA: A MEGAFONO based PRF

#### MEGAFONO and the PRF Hydra



# The body of Megafono/Hydra



- Even-Mansour construction [EM97]
  - If  $\mathcal{P}^{(B)}$  is PRP, attacker cannot know/control y
  - Allows cheaper and more efficient heads
- Cheaper Heads:
  - Cost of expensive body amortized for large data
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# Transitions to the Heads of MEGAFONO/HYDRA

- Unpredictable y already prevents many statistical attacks in Heads
  - Main concern of heads: Algebraic attacks
  - Strongest vector: Gröbner basis
  - Cost depends on degree and number of variables
- In CIMINION
  - Additional independent variables created by expensive key schedule
  - Key schedule instantiated as sponge with *P*<sup>(B)</sup>
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# The body of MEGAFONO/HYDRA (cont.)



- New idea in MEGAFONO:
  - Create new variables z from intermediate results for free!
- Expensive relations between *z*, *K*, and *y* 
  - $\Rightarrow$  Attacker forced to treat *z* as new variable
  - ⇒ More variables as in Сіміміом, but without key schedule

# The Heads of Megafono/Hydra

- Main concern: Algebraic attacks
  - Goal: Prevent inversion and cheap equation systems without K, y, or z
- Keyed permutation  $\mathcal{P}_{K}^{(H)}$  reintroduces *K*
- Combining multiple heads can cancel out *y*, *z* 
  - $\Rightarrow$  Prevented by feed forward!
- $\Rightarrow$  No truncation necessary to prevent inversion
  - More throughput compared to Сіміміом
- Non-linear rolling function *R<sub>i</sub>*



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y    z
>8
$\mathcal{K}_i(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$
$\mathcal{P}^{(\mathrm{H})}_{\mathrm{K}}(\cdot)$
•
*

# **HYDRA:** Concrete Instantiation



#### **HYDRA:** Instantiation

- Body instantiated as HADES [GLR+20]
  - External rounds prevent statistical attacks via wide trail design strategy
    - Cheap MDS matrix and power maps  $x \mapsto x^d$
  - Internal rounds prevent algebraic attacks
    - Generalized Lai-Massey construction [LM90]

Variants of 
$$y_i = x_i + \left(\sum_h (-1)^h \cdot x_h\right)^2$$

- Less multiplications than power maps for same degree
- Cheap matrix to prevent invariant subspace trail
- Heads instantiated similar to internal rounds
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# Number of Rounds for 128 bit Prime

- 6 external rounds in Body
  - 8 multiplications per round
  - Same as HADESMIMC [GLR+20]
- 42 internal rounds in Body
  - 2 multiplications per round
  - Strongest attack: Interpolation attack
  - 71 in HADESMIMC with same number of multiplications
- 39 rounds in Heads
  - 1 multiplication per round
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## Multiplicative Complexity – With Key Schedules



## Multiplicative Complexity – Without Key Schedules



#### Benchmarks

- In paper: Benchmarks using the MP-SPDZ library
  - SPDZ, 2 parties, LAN, offline + online phase
  - Encrypting t plaintext words with secret shared key
- Confirm expectation from previous slides
  - HYDRA significantly outperforms other ciphers
  - Only CIMINION (without key schedule) is slightly faster for small t
- Implementation Framework:
  - https://extgit.iaik.tugraz.at/krypto/mpc-zoo

#### Summary

- Megafono
  - New Farfalle based design strategy
- HYDRA:
  - Efficient and secure variant of Farfalle/CIMINION without key schedule
  - Minimized multiplicative complexity
  - Most efficient PRF in MPC
- Paper with extensive security analysis and benchmarks
  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/342.pdf
- Any further security analysis is welcome Image: Security analysis

# Questions ?



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